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1. Introduction
Following the end of General Franco’s dictator-
ship in November 1975, Spain witnessed ‘… the
most rapid and pervasive transformations, with no
aspect of social, economic and political life re-
maining untouched.’ (Bougen and Vázquez, 1997:
3). These transformations impinged on the audit
market, which experienced high growth amid the
steady process of deregulation and professional re-
forms that culminated in the enactment of the
Spanish Audit Law in 1988 (Bougen, 1997;
García-Benau et al., 1998, 1999). The reforms 
created a ‘new’ and modern auditing profession
and played an instrumental role in the booming de-
mand for audit services in Spain during the period
1976–1988. From its inception in 1942 until 1976,
the Institute of Sworn Auditors of Spain (Instituto
de Censores Jurados de Cuentas de España
(ICJCE)) had registered 2,626 newly certified au-
ditors. This figure doubled (5,255) in just 13 years
(1976–1988). This situation, characterised by a
mix of regulatory uncertainty and strong job mar-
ket prospects, constitutes a unique social laborato-
ry in which to examine the profile of newly
certified auditors.
As in many other countries (e.g. France:
Margerison and Moizer, 1996), the audit profes-
sion in Spain is separate from the accounting pro-
fession. In this setting, audit certification
constitutes a prerequisite for applying for an audit
licence and becoming a ‘licensed auditor’
(Ramírez, 2001).1 During the observation period,
to earn an audit certificate and become a newly
certified auditor of the ICJCE, a person needed to:
(i) be a Spanish citizen; (ii) be 18 years of age or
older; and (iii) hold a university degree or equiva-
lent. In addition, there were requirements to have:
(iv) passed a series of qualification exams, which
include subjects such as financial accounting,
management accounting, finance, and auditing; and
(v) never been convicted of a crime. Importantly,
the ICJCE’s by-laws approved in 1943 did not in-
clude professional experience as a prerequisite for
receiving the audit certificate. Upon meeting these
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1 This is equivalent to the concept of ‘responsible individu
als’ found in the UK.
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requirements, successful candidates were granted
an auditing certificate and gained membership into
the ICJCE. Newly certified auditors, therefore,
could then either apply for an auditing licence that
would enable them to sign audit reports (ejer-
cientes; licensed auditors) or register as an unli-
censed auditor (no ejercientes; unlicensed
auditors) (see Figure 1). Our study focuses on a
specific point in the auditor’s life (Carroll and
Mosakowski, 1987): the point at which newly cer-
tified auditors decided whether to apply for an au-
diting licence. ‘Unlicensed auditors’ could leave
the profession and obtain work in other sectors
(e.g. public sector, academia, and industry), or per-
form support activities in consultancy and auditing
firms. None of these activities required them to
hold an audit licence (see Figure 1). At that point
in time, we compare the individual profile of ‘li-
censed’ versus ‘unlicensed’ auditors.
Licensed auditors (i) must be on file in the offi-
cial tax register of the Ministry of Finance as a
freelance auditing professional, and (ii) must have
obtained acceptable insurance coverage for profes-
sional indemnity. Licensed auditors offer their pro-
fessional services either as self-employed auditors
or as partners in auditing firms. In this manner,
they become business owner-managers in the audit
market and, therefore, they are ‘first and fore-
most … entrepreneurs trying to make a successful
living by providing a service’ (Higson, 1997: 203).
As noted by Ramírez (2001), sole proprietorships
become instrumental organisational forms in the
earliest stages of the audit profession, suggesting
that individuals applying for an audit licence usu-
ally intend to become sole practitioners or partners
in an auditing firm (Dillard and Ferris, 1989: 224).
In turn, this implies that they are putting their per-
sonal wealth and human capital at stake
(DeAngelo, 1981: 25).
In this study, we focus on the relationship be-
tween certain individual characteristics of newly
certified auditors, such as education, age, and job
stability, and their decision to become business
owner-managers in the audit market during the pe-
riod 1976–1988. Lafuente and Salas (1989: 18)
showed that the personal characteristics of busi-
ness owner-managers ‘… are relevant factors in
the study of entrepreneurship, because they will lie
behind the supply side of entrepreneurial activities
and will have to be closely identified in any public
policy oriented to promote such activities.’
Consequently, our study focuses on the individual
auditor as a unit of analysis. In this manner, this in-
vestigation adds to prior research embracing a
macro-perspective on the emergence and evolution
of the audit profession in continental European
countries and, therefore, focuses on professional
associations or the profession at large (e.g.
Belgium: De Beelde, 2002; Czech Republic: Seal
et al., 1996; France: Ramírez, 2001; Germany:
Evans and Honold, 2007; Greece: Caramanis,
2002). On rare occasions, these studies surveyed
the opinions of auditors and financial executives to
outline the impact of liberalisation reforms on au-
ditor behaviour (Caramanis, 1998). As noted by
Bröcheler et al. (2004), individual auditors are the
most significant asset in the audit market and,
therefore, it is apposite to examine the individual
characteristics of those engaging in public practice
vis-à-vis their counterparts breaking from the pro-
296 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Figure 1
The process for engaging in audit practice
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fession immediately after earning the necessary
credentials.
Our examination of the individual traits of newly
certified auditors draws on an integration of
human capital theory and the entrepreneurship 
literature. The theory of human capital has high-
lighted some of the individual determinants of en-
trepreneurship (e.g. Carr, 1996), such as the effects
of the founder’s human capital on organisational
performance, including the case of auditing firms
(e.g. Preisendörfer and Voss, 1990; Pennings et al.,
1998; Bröcheler et al., 2004). A basic tenet of
human capital theory is that individuals spend time
and money on themselves for the sake of future pe-
cuniary and non-pecuniary returns (Blaug, 1976),
thereby increasing their specific or general human
capital (Becker, 1975). General human capital
refers to the acquisition of comprehensive formal
education and training, such as a university degree
that is relatively transferable across firms and in-
dustries. Conversely, specific human capital
strengthens an individual’s knowledge about the
idiosyncratic routines and procedures utilised in a
particular firm. This is less easily transferred. For
those who apply for an auditing licence, the audit-
ing certificate constitutes a prerequisite for estab-
lishing their own business or becoming a partner in
an auditing firm. In contrast, for those uninterest-
ed in public practice, the auditing certificate repre-
sents a professional qualification that could
arguably expand labour market opportunities
(Bullen and Flamholtz, 1985). Considering the
highly fragmented nature of the audit market
(Dillard and Ferris, 1989; Ramírez, 2001), we
deem that the integration of the human capital and
entrepreneurship frameworks is relevant in ex-
plaining some specificities of the auditing profes-
sion. Ultimately, this may be helpful in laying the
groundwork for future research in this area.
2. The setting
2.1. Legislative reform
The 1951 Companies Act established the an-
tecedents of the auditing function in Spain.
Inspired by French legislation (Ramírez, 2001:
407), the Act required the appointment of share-
holders (the so-called accionistas-censores) to in-
vestigate a firm’s financial statements. As noted by
Cubillo Valverde (1990: 303): ‘As far as auditing
is concerned, the 1951 Act was unfortunate.
Instead of entrusting such a relevant function … to
the experts [the members of the ICJCE], the Act
attributed to shareholders the role of auditors.’ In
this context, external audits were demanded in the
case of conflict and audits performed by share-
holders actually resulted in an exercise of ‘ficti-
tious auditing’ (García-Benau et al., 1998: 89–90).
As this legal initiative brought about widespread
dissatisfaction among qualified auditors (ICJCE,
1951, 1957, 1960), some legislative reforms fur-
ther enforced auditing provisions (Pacheco, 2000).
As far as firms listed on the stock market were
concerned, the Decreto–Ley 7/1964 and its ac-
companying legislation established some require-
ments for mandatory audits. Notwithstanding this
legislation, disputes around the meaning of an
audit (Pont Mestres, 1991; García-Benau et al.,
1998) as well as the qualifications of those engag-
ing in public practice resulted in a marginalised
audit function.
In 1986, Spain joined the European Economic
Community and this involved further legislative
reforms in the accounting and auditing domain,
which the regulatory bodies had been trying to an-
ticipate since 1979 (Bougen and Vázquez, 1997:
3). The creation of two new associations of audi-
tors2 in the early 1980s brought to an end the mo-
nopoly of ICJCE members in the provision of
auditing services. Importantly for our purpose, no
major attempt was made to develop a cohesive and
credible infrastructure and the resulting situation
featured ‘division and struggle’ (Cea García, 1992:
349). As in Greece (Dedoulis and Caramanis,
2007: 16), using the notion of ‘profession’ to refer
to the auditing practice in Spain during this period
would be contentious. The process of legislative
reforms concluded with the passing of the Audit
Law in 1988.
2.2. The economy
During the military dictatorship of General
Franco, the Spanish economy operated under the
principles of state intervention and autarchy
(Carrera et al., 2001). In this context, the state set
the prices of a considerable number of goods (e.g.
bread and sugar), thereby neglecting the role of
market forces. Furthermore, state-owned enter-
prises exerted an imposing role on sectors ranging
from banking to hospitality through to manufac-
turing.
The Spanish government enforced stiff reforms
to make the country conform to the principles of a
free economy. Such reforms paid off. According to
the World Bank, Spanish gross domestic product
increased by an average rate of 3.7% during
1976–1988, compared with 2.5% in the US and
2.8% in the UK. In a related vein, Spanish exports
increased by an average rate of 6.0% during that
period, the outflows of foreign direct investments
grew by 14.0%, and the inflows of direct 
foreign investments increased from an average of 
ESP 979.6bn during 1978–1986 to ESP 2,263.3bn
during 1986–1989 (Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-
Rivero, 1994). In short, this booming of the Spanish
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economy resulted in the Madrid Stock Market be-
coming the most profitable one in Europe in 1985
and 1986.
2.3. The audit market
Some international audit firms have operated in
Spain since the 1920s (Carrera et al., 2001).
However, most of the big audit firms started oper-
ations during the 1960s amid the enforcement of
certain mandatory audit requirements for firms
listed on the stock market (Decreto–Ley 7/1964).
For example, Deloitte, Plender, Haskins & Sells
started operations in Madrid in 1964 (Stevens,
1981). In the case of Price Waterhouse, Jones
(1995: 283) noted: ‘In nations, such as Italy and
Spain, where the national accountancy profession
remained embryonic, Price Waterhouse made the
greatest progress. It built up a strong local client
base and recruited and trained members of the in-
digenous population as professional staff and part-
ners, supported by expatriates.’ Finally, some other
audit corporations established strategic alliances
with domestic firms; in 1963, Hispano Suiza de
Revisión was founded to insource audit work from
audit multinationals. In the 1970s, Revisión sig-
nalled its partnership with Coopers & Lybrand,
S.A. by changing its brand to Revispana y Coopers
& Lybrand, S.A.
At the beginning of our observation period, the
Big Eight firms operated in Spain. Furthermore,
such firms usually employed ICJCE members. Our
searches in the ICJCE’s archives reveal that Price
Waterhouse employed 89 members of the ICJCE;
Arthur Andersen, 60; Peat Marwick Mitchell, 24;
Ernst and Whinney, 19; Touche and Ross, 90; and
Binder Dijker Otte & Co., 4.
The demand for audit services increased in
Spain from the start of our observation period. For
example, the number of listed firms audited by
members of the ICJCE increased dramatically be-
tween 1974 and 1976, from 401 to 698 firms
(74%). In a related vein, the number of requests for
ICJCE members to offer their professional servic-
es in litigation increased from 60 to 111 between
1974 and 1976. The annual reports of the ICJCE
also indicated continued expansion in audits for
non-listed firms, state-owned enterprises, cham-
bers of commerce, and regional authorities.
Because of the increasing demand for audit servic-
es, the number of certified auditors doubled during
our observation period.
For ‘unlicensed auditors’, that is, individuals
breaking from the profession at the time of earning
the necessary credentials, our search in the
ICJCE’s archives for the period under investiga-
tion shows that 44% (354 individuals) worked for
the public sector: at different ministries (31.5%,
253 individuals), state-owned enterprises (7.5%,
60 individuals), and universities (5%, 41 individ-
uals). The remaining 56% of ‘unlicensed auditors’
worked for the private sector: 23.6% (190 individ-
uals) at consultancy and audit firms, 7.5% (60 in-
dividuals) in the financial sector, and 24.4% (196
individuals) in sundry industries.
2.4. Education
Spanish higher education institutions were tradi-
tionally populated by the wealthy as well as by
those living in cities that host a university centre
(e.g. Madrid, Barcelona, Salamanca, and Santiago;
see Vila and Mora, 1998). The advent of the
Spanish democracy changed this situation; in the
case of degrees in economics and business admin-
istration, the number of university centres in-
creased from 15 in 1976 to 23 in 1988 (Gutiérrez
and Ortega, 2007) and, hence, made such studies
accessible to students lacking the necessary fund-
ing to pay for board and lodging outside their
homes.
Spain has a number of different levels of univer-
sity education. In the period 1976–1988, the
Spanish higher education system offered three
types of programmes: (i) short-cycle programmes,
comprising three-year university degrees; (ii)
long-cycle programmes, typically five-year uni-
versity degrees, although the length of these pro-
grammes increases to six years for engineering and
medical degrees; and (iii) postgraduate degrees,
such as doctorates, implying a long-cycle educa-
tion programme as a prerequisite, and consisting
of doctoral courses plus the delivery of a doctoral
thesis. Doctoral programmes targeted individuals
aiming for a university career (Vila and Mora,
1998: 173). Expansion in the number of university
centres during our observation period brought
about significant increases in the number of indi-
viduals earning three-year university degrees (e.g.
1,734 individuals in 1978–1979 and 4,081 individ-
uals in 1987–1988) and, to a much larger extent,
five-year university degrees (e.g. 1,488 individuals
in 1978–1979 and 7,088 individuals in 1987–1988;
see Anuario INE, 1979, 1988). In terms of social
reputation, six-year degrees in medicine, architec-
ture, and engineering are still highly regarded by
Spanish society (Vila and Mora, 1998).
2.5. The public sector
The Spanish public sector experienced dramatic
changes following the advent of democracy in
1976. As a consequence of the legislative reforms
that followed the approval of the Spanish
Constitution of 1978, the public sector steadily
changed its focus from being an instrument of
General Franco’s dictatorship to providing service
to the citizens (García de Enterría, 2007). In turn,
this involved changes in societal understandings of
accountability. Whilst General Franco and his
regime were only ‘accountable before God and
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history’ (De la Cierva, 1973), the President of the
National Jury (Audiencia Nacional) said in 1981:
‘Those entrusted to manage the goods of others –
either public or private – should render accounts of
their activities’ (quoted in Valverdú Calafell, 1984:
104). Such ideas, which were common in Western
democracies, involved a complete reshuffle of the
Internal Auditing Agency of the Public Sector in
1982 (IAAPS, Tribunal de Cuentas del Reino),
and this enhanced the expectations of those willing
to pursue an auditing career within the public sec-
tor.
3. Hypotheses
3.1. General human capital
Individuals with high levels of general human
capital are expected to be more efficient in their
jobs and enjoy a considerably greater number of
labour market opportunities (Becker, 1962).
Conversely, individuals with low levels of general
human capital are regarded as less efficient in the
workplace and are more likely to face spells of un-
employment (Blaug, 1976). Accordingly, individu-
als who aim to increase their general human
capital are prone to sacrifice current returns be-
cause of the expectation of higher future earnings
(Mincer, 1962; Blaug, 1970). In view of such in-
ternal and external opportunities, these individuals
are regarded as less likely than their counterparts
to change their occupational status through self-
employment (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998).
Taken together, these results clearly reflect the de-
cision to become an owner-manager as the default
career choice.
Given the nature of the audit market (a profes-
sional services market), human capital can help
explain the success or failure of auditing firms
(Bröcheler et al., 2004). Auditors with a high level
of educational attainment are expected to deliver
consistent and high-quality services inside their
firms (Pennings et al., 1998; Bröcheler et al.,
2004). Several studies provided evidence on the
relationship between general human capital and
important characteristics of the audit market, such
as the performance of auditing firms and the im-
pact of human resources policies.3 Hunton and
Wier (1996), for example, investigated the promo-
tion of accountants working for private firms and
found that attainment of education and profession-
al certification – that is, general human capital –
exerted a significant, positive influence on the
time-to-promotion decision.4 Moreover, Hunton
and Wier (1996) found that professionally certified
accountants were promoted more quickly than
their non-certified counterparts.
These insights are relevant in understanding the
characteristics of entrepreneurial activity in Spain.
As a consequence of the highly interventionist
economic model under Franco’s dictatorship, not
until the 1980s did an entrepreneurial culture begin
to take root. Studies showed that Spanish entrepre-
neurs engage in entrepreneurial activities only
through necessity, and seldom see such activities
as an opportunity (Reynolds et al., 2001: 94). In
other words, Spanish individuals perceive the de-
cision to start a new business as the default career
choice (Coduras et al., 2003: 34). This leads us to
hypothesise:
H1: General human capital is negatively associat-
ed with the likelihood of newly certified
Spanish auditors becoming licensed auditors.
3.2. Specific human capital
Mincer (1962) conceptualised specific training
as an investment that increases the marginal prod-
uct of those who invest in it by improving an 
individual’s knowledge of workplace routines 
and procedures. As noted by Becker (1975), the
idiosyncratic nature of specific human capital
makes its transfer across organisations difficult.
Individuals who acquire specific human capital
engage in within-firm training programmes and
have on-the-job experiences that increase their ex-
pectations of promotion and tenure, thereby pro-
viding little incentive for leaving the firm (Capelli
and Cascio, 1991; Mincer, 1993).
Auditing firms face high levels of employee
turnover, which affects their efficiency (Rhode et
al., 1977; Rasch and Harrell, 1990). To curb this
problem, auditing firms deploy internal, extensive,
and compulsory training programmes that increase
the expertise of their employees in a firm’s rou-
tines and procedures, and ultimately result in the
enhancement of specific human capital (Pennings
et al., 1998). These training programmes are often
regarded as part of a general programme of social-
isation for individuals into the organisational cul-
ture, and therefore, ‘they are first and foremost a
commitment to an individual firm.’ (Anderson-
Gough et al., 1998: 3; 2002). Specific human cap-
ital helps to produce high-quality auditing services
and decreases employee turnover as well as the
likelihood of becoming self-employed in the audit-
ing market (Robson et al., 1996; Lane and Parkin,
1998).
The Spanish audit market featured high uncer-
tainty during our observation period. Despite
prospects of growing demand for audits, several
accounting scandals (e.g. in 1983, Explosivos Río
Tinto) and a continuous conflict among auditors
brought about societal and legal understandings of
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the audit function as an ‘activity’ instead of a ‘pro-
fession’ (Carrera, 2003). Furthermore, the future
of auditing was highly dependent on the passing of
specific regulation by the Spanish Parliament.
Arguably, newly certified auditors with high spe-
cific human capital experienced conflicts between
opportunities arising from the expected, growing
demand for audit services and high uncertainty
about the future of the profession. Under conflict-
ing circumstances such as those featured by the
Spanish audit market, Hofstede (1997) suggested
that individuals draw heavily on their national cul-
ture to make decisions. In this respect, Spain
scored highly (90) in Hofstede’s index for uncer-
tainty avoidance, that is, the Spanish society did
not have tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty
(e.g. for comparison purposes, the UK scored 40 in
this metric). Consequently, newly certified
Spanish auditors with high specific human capital
would have leaned towards pursuing their careers
in their current firms and, hence, refrained from
engaging in entrepreneurial activities that would
have involved financial investments, high risks
and high market uncertainty. Thus, we make the
following hypothesis:
H2: Specific human capital is negatively associ-
ated with the likelihood of newly certified
Spanish auditors becoming licensed auditors.
3.3. Age
The entrepreneurship literature contends that
self-employment decisions are contingent on the
age of the individual (Casson, 1982). Arguably,
young people lack the experience, skills, and ma-
terial resources to ensure successful entry into the
entrepreneurial market (Blanchflower et al., 2001)
and may use the auditing certificate as a formal en-
dorsement of their professional qualifications.
Therefore, it is expected that the decision to be-
come an owner-manager is more likely to be made
by older individuals (Carr, 1996; Blanchflower et
al., 2001). Furthermore, individuals close to retire-
ment tend to be risk-averse (Bates, 1990), suggest-
ing they are reluctant to leave salaried work for the
uncertainties of self-employment (Hachen, 1990).
Legal and financial risks inherent in the auditing
profession (Simunic and Stein, 1996; Dalton et al.,
1997) add to the usual uncertainties of entrepre-
neurship. At the same time, the expectations of fi-
nancial returns for older, newly certified auditors
are lower because they are restricted to the re-
maining short period until retirement. Conversely,
middle-aged individuals have accumulated work
experience, knowledge of the market, and profes-
sional reputation (Knight, 1921; Brüderl et al.,
1992). Furthermore, they can expect the returns
from their entrepreneurial efforts over a relatively
longer period before retirement. In addition, the
middle-aged auditor is likely to have sufficient
material resources to establish a new business and
to tackle its concomitant financial and legal risks.
Arguably, middle-aged, newly certified auditors
are more likely than their younger and older coun-
terparts to apply immediately for an audit licence
and to become business owner-managers, either on
their own or with a partner or partners.
In the case of Spain, Carrasco (1999) examined
the transitions to and from self-employment by
drawing on data gathered from an extensive data-
base, the Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure
Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa, ECPF) for
the period 1985–1991. Carrasco (1999) focused on
entrants into self-employment from wage earners
and unemployed individuals and found that mid-
dle-aged individuals (35–55 years old) accounted
for the majority of entrants in both situations,
57.71% and 51.46% respectively. Interestingly
also, young individuals had a higher propensity to
go entrepreneurial from wage-earning positions
(27.82%) than from unemployment (17.39%). In
the latter case, they probably lacked the necessary
financial resources (Carrasco, 1999: 341). Taken
together, this reasoning leads us to make the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
H3: Age has an inverted U-shaped relationship
with the likelihood of newly certified
Spanish auditors becoming licensed auditors.
3.4. Switching costs: job stability
The chances of starting a new business are neg-
atively related to the costs of leaving an employ-
ment situation (Gimeno et al., 1997). Newly
certified auditors assess their switching costs by
comparing their current occupational status with
the eventual ownership of a firm in the auditing
market. The latter involves risks arising from
client and third-party liability (e.g. Simunic and
Stein, 1996; Dalton et al., 1997; Johnstone, 2000).
People working in positions characterised by a
high degree of stability, security, and insulation
from external competition may consider this risk
as being too high (Hachen, 1990).
Public sector employees provide a particularly
strong example of switching costs because they
enjoy long-term stability, regular salary, pre-
dictability, and an internal system of promotion
(Hinchliffe, 1987). This is evidenced by low em-
ployee turnover in public sector jobs (Hachen,
1990). In Spain, the employment conditions of
civil servants (funcionarios) are such that public
sector employees enjoy high social status (García-
Pérez and Jimeno, 2006). Consequently, Spain is
one country where ‘… there are typically several
hundred, even thousands, of applicants for each
vacancy in the public sector, while some occupa-
tions in the private sector find it difficult to hire
new employees’ (García-Pérez and Jimeno, 2006:
10).
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This is particularly appropriate in describing the
behaviour of certified auditors in Spain, a country
whose nationals have a high level of risk aversion
(Coduras et al., 2003) and uncertainty avoidance
(Hofstede, 1997). As noted by some commenta-
tors, this makes individuals prefer a stable income
in public sector-related activities rather than an un-
certain, albeit potentially higher, income from self-
employment (Reynolds et al., 2001). For Spanish
individuals therefore, ‘there remains a strong pref-
erence for stable income in a state-owned compa-
ny or in the public sector’ (Reynolds et al., 2001:
40). During our observation period, public sector
employees enjoyed stable income and a high social
appreciation, which made it difficult for them to go
entrepreneurial through applying for an auditing
licence, especially in view of career prospects
within the public sector as a consequence of the
reshuffle of the IAAPS (Valverdú Calafell, 1984).
Therefore, we would expect newly certified audi-
tors in stable jobs, such as the public sector, to use
their auditing certificate to enhance their chances
of promotion within the public sector, rather than
taking the high risk and high uncertainty route of
applying for an auditing licence and becoming
owner-managers in the audit market. Thus, we
make the following hypothesis:
H4: Newly certified Spanish auditors with high
switching costs from their present occupation
have a lower likelihood of becoming licensed
auditors.
4. Data source, variables and methods
4.1. Data source
Our research is based on information gathered
from the archives of the ICJCE concerning their li-
censed and unlicensed members. The ICJCE’s di-
rectories contain information about members’
names, addresses, and dates of admission to the
ICJCE, as well as their educational background,
occupational status, previous positions, and even-
tual application for an auditing licence at the time
of entry to the ICJCE. Our data are based on 2,633
individuals with completed entries who earned an
auditing certificate between 1976 and 1988. Of
these, 1,931 (73.34%) registered as licensed audi-
tors at the time of joining the ICJCE, and 702
(26.66%) did not apply for an auditing licence (un-
licensed auditors).5
4.2. Methods
We use logistic regression to model the likeli-
hood of newly certified auditors becoming li-
censed auditors (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989). In
auditing research, Dalton et al. (1997) used this
model to examine the decision regarding the even-
tual withdrawal of a firm’s partner to avoid litiga-
tion risks. What distinguishes a logistic regression
model from a linear regression model is that the
outcome variable (in our case, ‘licensed auditors’)
is dichotomous. That is, the variable takes a value
of 1 if the individual is a ‘licensed auditor’ and 0 if
the individual is an ‘unlicensed auditor’. Logistic
regression models permit us to estimate the proba-
bility of an individual applying for an audit li-
cence. Therefore, the probability of becoming a
licensed auditor is:
(1) ,
where
g(X) = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + … + bpxp,
Π(X) = probability (licensed auditor),
β0 is the estimated constant,β1 through to βp are the estimated coefficients,
and
χ1 through to χp are the independent variables.
The estimated coefficients for the independent
variables represent the slope or rate of change of
the logit function of the dependent variable (‘li-
censed auditors’) per unit change in the independ-
ent variable. The interpretation of each coefficient
relates directly to the definition and meaning of a
one unit of change in the independent variable.6
4.3. Operationalisation of variables
Audit licence
As previously stated, the dependent variable
Audit licence depicts the decision of the newly cer-
tified auditor to apply for an auditing licence and
become a licensed auditor. This dichotomous vari-
able was coded 1 = licensed auditor and 0 = unli-
censed auditor. This categorisation is similar to the
studies in the review by Amemiya (1981) of indi-
vidual choices among labour market opportunities.
Education
Both human capital theory and the auditing liter-
ature used years of education and education level
as proxies for general human capital (e.g. Carroll
and Mosakowski, 1987; Carr, 1996; Hunton and
Wier, 1996; Pennings et al., 1998). To categorise
the variable Education, we need to consider both
the entry requirements of the profession and the
characteristics of the Spanish university system. In
our sample, all individuals are certified auditors
and, hence, hold a university degree or equivalent.
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auditors for the period under investigation. One hundred ob
servations were excluded from the analyses because of miss
ing data.
6 The intercept coefficient may also be of interest (Hosmer
and Lemeshow, 1989). In our case, the intercept coefficient
captures some factors affecting the probability of becoming a
licensed auditor unmeasured by the variables included in the
model.
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Accordingly, we categorise the Education variable
as follows: 1 = a three-year university degree; 2 =
a five-year university degree; and 3 = a postgradu-
ate degree (e.g. PhD).
Big firms
Large organisations are often characterised by
considerable distances between units and employ-
ees. This brings about potential problems with
standardising products and services, as well as
maintaining internal cohesion. Consequently, 
large firms seek to acquaint their employees with
routines and procedures, providing them with ex-
pansive in-house training programmes (Alba-
Ramírez, 1994). Large auditing firms provide their
employees with more structured training to help
enhance their competency and expertise in per-
forming audits (Chia, 2003: 104). Empirical evi-
dence on the training programmes of large
auditing firms reveals a complex web of formal
and informal rules that must be learned by individ-
uals working for these organisations (Anderson-
Gough et al., 1998; Grey, 1998; Pennings et al.,
1998). However, the routines of small accounting
firms are not as formally established, and employ-
ees acquire these through significant on-the-job
exposure (Humphrey et al., 2006). In sum, auditors
working for leading domestic or international au-
diting firms are expected to gain more specific
human capital than their counterparts in smaller
firms.
The Big firms variable was created to identify in-
dividuals working for large auditing firms at the
time of affiliation with the ICJCE. This variable
was coded 1 = individual worked for a leading do-
mestic or international auditing firm at the time of
joining the ICJCE, and 0 = individual did not work
for such a firm.
Age
This variable is regularly employed in both the
human capital and entrepreneurship literature
(Becker, 1975; Rhode et al., 1977; Evans and
Leighton, 1989; Carr, 1996). We employ a contin-
uous variable to measure the individual’s age in
years at the time of joining the ICJCE. We hypoth-
esise a quadratic or U-shaped relationship between
the individual’s age and the likelihood of engaging
in auditing practice. Both the variable Age and its
square value (AgeSQ) are included to capture any
non-linearity in the relationship (Hosmer and
Lemeshow, 1989: 95).
Public sector
We used the dichotomy between the ‘public sec-
tor’ and the ‘private sector’ as a proxy for stability
and security. In this respect, our dichotomous vari-
able, Public sector, is coded 1 = individual was
working in the public sector at the time of joining
the ICJCE, and 0 = individual did not work in the
public sector.
Control variables
Previous research shows gender differences in
the Spanish auditing market (Carrera, 2003). In
fact, women were barred from the auditing profes-
sion by the ICJCE until 1976. Although the num-
ber of women in the ICJCE has increased every
year since 1976, the number of men joining the
ICJCE has remained significantly higher, ensuring
that auditing remains a male-dominated profession
(Carrera et al., 2001). Research on self-employ-
ment decisions show that women’s decisions differ
from men’s: women, for instance, place greater
emphasis on their families when making the entre-
preneurial decision (Carr, 1996; Blanchflower and
Oswald, 1998). Thus, we created a Gender vari-
able, coded 1 = female and 0 = male.
The supply of auditing services depends on the
number of auditors in the market (Pennings et al.,
1998). In the case of the Spanish auditing market,
auditor density is largely contingent on geo-
graphical distribution. The provinces of Madrid,
Barcelona, Seville, Valencia, and Biscay reported
the highest density of auditors during our observa-
tion period. Thus, we create the variable Market
density to identify the province in which auditors
established their offices and offered their profes-
sional services: 1 = individual established in
Madrid, Barcelona, Seville, Valencia, or Biscay;
and 0 = individual established elsewhere.
We argue that the decision to become a licensed
auditor may also be influenced by contextual fac-
tors, such as expected changes and actual enforce-
ment of auditing regulations, as well as by the
general economic situation. Therefore, the moment
an individual is granted an auditing certificate may
constitute a relevant variable for explaining the
likelihood of applying for an auditing licence. We
created the variable Year of qualification as an in-
dicator of the time the individual joined the
ICJCE, establishing four subperiods in an attempt
to capture significant changes in the Spanish au-
diting profession. First, we consider the period
1976–1979, which is characterised by a monopoly
of ICJCE members in the provision of auditing
services to firms established in Spain. Second, the
period 1980–1983 witnessed the removal of this
monopoly and the emergence of other profession-
al associations (i.e. Registro de Economistas
Auditores (REA)). Third, the period 1984–1987 is
characterised by the actual challenge from auditors
of other professional associations to ICJCE’s
members. Finally, we considered 1988 as the year
when the Spanish Audit Law was discussed and
passed in the Spanish parliament.
5. Descriptive analysis and results
5.1. Descriptive analysis
We conducted a preliminary analysis of the rela-
tionship between the dependent and independent
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variables. The univariate analysis revealed some
degree of association between the variables in-
cluded in our model and the probability of apply-
ing for an auditing licence. Table 1 presents the
basic descriptive statistics and the correlation ma-
trix for the variables included in the model. As
shown in Table 1, the arithmetic means indicate
that licensed auditors have a lower education level
and are older than unlicensed auditors, and that the
latter are more likely to work for the public sector.
The correlation matrix shows that there are many
significant correlations. However, these are of
such a low magnitude that the potential for
collinearity in our model is limited.
Table 2 describes the categorical variables in-
cluded in the model (Education, Big firms, Public
sector, Market density, and Gender). Data for the
variable Education show that the highest percent-
age of licensed auditors is among those holding a
three-year university degree (633 of 724 individu-
als or 87% are licensed auditors). For certified au-
ditors with a five-year university degree, this
percentage drops to 68% (1,242 of 1,817 individu-
als). In the case of the variable Big firms, we found
that 308 individuals of the 491 working for large
auditing firms are licensed auditors (approximate-
ly 63%). For those who do not work for large au-
diting firms, the percentage is higher (about 80%).
The percentage of licensed auditors among those
working for the public sector is around 50% (277
of 554 certified auditors). In relation to the control
variable Market density, Table 2 shows that 71%
of individuals in provinces with a high density of
auditors applied for an audit licence. For the vari-
able Gender, the sample indicates that approxi-
mately 66% of women and 74% of men are
licensed auditors. Lastly, the number of individu-
als becoming certified auditors diminished over
the years (see Year); this is mainly because of the
decline in the number of licensed auditors and, we
argue, a decline in market growth. While in the co-
hort of 1976–1979, the proportion of individuals
obtaining an audit licence was 81.7% (770 of 943
individuals), in 1988 the percentage dropped to
71% (485 of 684 individuals). The variable Age
was included in the model as a continuous variable
and its basic statistics are also reported in Table 1.
5.2. Results
Model 1 in Table 3 shows the results of the mul-
tivariate logistic regression model for H1–H4. All
variables other than Gender and the constant are
significant at α = 0.01. The Hosmer–Lemeshow
goodness-of-fit test indicates that the model is well
suited to the data.
H1 states that the likelihood of newly certified
auditors becoming licensed auditors is negatively
associated with the level of general human capital.
We would have support for this contention if the
coefficients of the Five-year university degree and
Post-graduate degree (master’s degree or doctor-
ate) variables were negative and significant.
Model 1 in Table 3 reveals that both Five-year uni-
versity degree and Post-graduate degree (master’s
degree or doctorate) variables have negative
(–0.724 and –0.758, respectively) and significant
(α = 0.01) coefficients. The estimated coefficients
indicate that a change in the level of education (a
higher education level than that existing in the
control group Three-year university degree) has a
negative impact on the likelihood of obtaining an
audit licence. This finding indicates ceteris paribus
that newly certified auditors with high general
human capital were less likely to apply for an au-
diting licence and become business owner-man-
agers in the audit market than their counterparts.
H2 contends that the likelihood of newly certi-
fied auditors becoming licensed auditors is nega-
tively associated with their level of specific human
capital. There is support for H2 if the coefficient of
the Big firms variable is negative and significant.
Model 1 reveals that the coefficient for Big firms is
negative (–0.884) and significant (α = 0.01).
Consequently, this finding indicates that newly
certified auditors with high levels of specific
human capital were less likely to apply for an au-
diting licence and become licensed auditors than
their counterparts. All other things being equal,
newly certified auditors who had been exposed to
on-the-job training programmes in their firm (e.g.
a large auditing firm) were less likely to apply for
an auditing licence and become business owner-
managers through self-employment than their
counterparts (e.g. those employed by small to
medium-sized auditing firms).
H3 investigates the relationship between age and
the likelihood of applying for an audit licence. H3
predicts that the decision of a newly certified audi-
tor to become a licensed auditor exhibits an invert-
ed U-shaped relationship with age. Our results
show that both Age and AgeSQ are significant (α =
0.01), and suggest a concave relationship between
age and the likelihood of applying for an audit li-
cence to become a business owner-manager in the
audit market. This finding is reinforced by the re-
sults of the estimated odds ratios for Age, as de-
rived from Model 1.7 Figure 2 shows the adjusted
odds ratios for Age and illustrates the differences
in the likelihood of becoming a licensed auditor
for individuals of different ages, with the propen-
Vol. 38 No. 4. 2008 303
7 We use the odds ratios because they provide a straightfor
ward comparison of the likelihood of the event of becoming a
licensed auditor among individuals of different ages (Hosmer
and Lemeshow, 1989). Furthermore, we calculate the adjusted
odds ratios instead of the adjusted estimated probabilities to
avoid the eventual confounding effects of other variables in
cluded in our model.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics for categorical variables
Variables Unlicensed auditors Licensed auditors Total
N = 702 (26.66%) N = 1,931 (73.34%) N = 2,633 (100%)
Education
Three year university degree 91 633 724
(3.46%) (24.04%) (27.50%)
Five year university degree 575 1242 1817
(21.84%) (47.17%) (69.01%)
Postgraduate degree 36 56 92
(master’s degree or doctorate) (1.37%) (2.13%) (3.49%)
Big firms
No 519 1,623 2,142
(19.71%) (61.64%) (81.35%)
Yes 183 308 491
(6.95%) (11.70%) (18.65%)
Public sector
No 425 1,654 2,079
(16.14%) (62.82%) (78.96%)
Yes 277 277 554
(10.52%) (10.52%) (21.04%)
Market density
High density: Madrid, Barcelona, 550 1,363 1,913
Seville, Valencia, and Biscay (20.89%) (51.77%) (27.34%)
Other 152 568 720
(5.77%) (21.57%) (27.34%)
Gender
Male 630 1,792 2,422
(23.93%) (68.06%) (91.99%)
Female 72 139 211
(2.73%) (5.28%) (8.01%)
Year of qualification
1976 1979 173 770 943
(6.57%) (29.24%) (35.81%)
1980 1983 244 527 771
(9.27%) (20.02%) (29.28%)
1984 1987* 86 149 235
(3.27%) (5.66%) (8.93%)
1988 199 485 684
(7.56%) (18.42%) (25.98%)
*There were no new auditors in our sample in 1986 and 1987.
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Table 3
Logit analysis results to test for differences between licensed auditors and unlicensed auditors
Model 1 Model 2
(Main effects) (Main effects and interaction)
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
Constant 1.631** 0.678
(0.964) (1.013)
Education
Five year university degree 0.724* 0.752*
(0.139) (0.139)
Postgraduate degree 0.758* 0.771*
(master’s degree or doctorate) (0.262) (0.300)
Big firms 0.884* 3.522*
(0.135) (0.743)
Age 0.241* 0.199*
(0.050) (0.052)
AgeSQ 0.003* 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001)
Public sector 1.634* 1.601*
(0.118) (0.118)
Gender 0.010 0.099
(0.170) (0.171)
Market density 0.338* 0.340*
(0.117) (0.117)
Year of qualification
1980 1983 0.768* 0.778*
(0.126) (0.126)
1984 1987 0.498* 0.747*
(0.186) (0.200)
1988 0.386* 0.380*
(0.135) (0.136)
Age  Big firms 0.087*
(0.024)
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.14
Log L 1,325.52 1,318.07
LR Chi2 (10) 402.52 417.43
p > Chi2 0.000 0.000
Standard errors are in parentheses
* p = 0.01 (two tailed test)
** p = 0.10
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sity of individuals 33 years old being equal to one.
Figure 2 shows that middle-aged, newly certi-
fied auditors were more likely to apply for an audit
licence than their younger or older counterparts.
Our results show that the likelihood of becoming a
licensed auditor increases until individuals reach
38–39 years, at which point a negative relationship
exists between age and the propensity to become a
business owner-manager in the audit market.
Furthermore, we compare the propensity of a 33-
year-old certified auditor to become a business
owner-manager in the audit market (propensity
equal to 1) vis-à-vis their counterparts of other
ages. Our results reveal that such a propensity was:
(i) 0.6 among 25-year-old individuals, (ii) 1.12 for
39-year-olds, and (iii) 0.52 among 55-year-olds. In
support of H3, our results indicate that younger
and older newly certified Spanish auditors were
less likely to apply for an audit licence and become
business owner-managers.
H4 states that the likelihood of becoming a li-
censed auditor in Spain is negatively associated
with the stability and security of the individual’s
job position at the time of becoming a certified au-
ditor. Support for this contention requires the coef-
ficient for Public sector to be significant and
negative. Model 1 in Table 3 shows that the coef-
ficient of the variable is negative (–1.634) and sig-
nificant (α = 0.01). Ceteris paribus, this indicates
that newly certified auditors working for the
Spanish public sector are less likely to apply for an
audit licence than those working in the private sec-
tor. This suggests that the security and stability of
the public sector jobs held by these individuals at
the time of earning an audit certificate made them
less likely to apply for an audit licence and become
business owner-managers in the market for audit-
ing services.8
With the exception of Gender and the intercept,
the remaining control variables for both models
are all significant at α = 0.01 (see Model 1, Table
3). The coefficients for the dummies of the vari-
able Year of qualification are negative, suggesting
that the likelihood of becoming a licensed auditor
in the Spanish auditing market was smaller during
the 1980s (subperiods 1980–1983, 1984–1987,
and 1988) in comparison with the first subperiod,
1976–1979. However, this negative impact is pro-
portionally smaller over time, indicating that indi-
viduals are more likely to apply for an audit
licence and become business owner-managers at
the end of the period under investigation than pre-
viously. The political stability of the 1980s, the
economic growth experienced by the country, and
the expectations generated by the new regulations
for the Spanish auditing market (e.g. the Audit
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Figure 2
Propensity to become a licensed auditor by age (adjusted odds ratios)
8 A lack of skills and competence in managing an audit busi
ness constitutes an equally plausible explanation. We thank an
anonymous referee for this insight.
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Law was enacted in 1988) could partly explain this
trend. Finally, the coefficient for Market density is
significant and negative (see Model 1, Table 3). As
expected, individuals were less likely to apply for
an audit licence and become business owner-man-
agers in the auditing market in regions with a high-
er number of potential competitors.
5.3. Additional analysis
One beneficial effect of specific human capital
could be the increased likelihood of promotion
into a partnership in an auditing firm, a position re-
quiring a comprehensive knowledge of internal
procedures and a commitment to the firm
(Anderson-Gough et al., 1998). If the accumula-
tion of specific human capital is not largely de-
pendent on time and seniority (Becker, 1975), it
would be difficult for auditing firms to provide in-
tensive in-company training to employees while
simultaneously delivering professional services to
clients. Therefore, employees with greater seniori-
ty in auditing firms have arguably accumulated
sufficient specific human capital to become eligi-
ble for promotion to partnership positions. In ac-
countancy firms, a regular career from a junior
accountant to a partnership position takes between
10 and 14 years (Robson et al., 1996; Expansión,
24 June 2004: 24). Promotion to a partnership po-
sition in these professional service firms makes an
individual a business owner-manager. This pro-
duces a shift in their professional status.
Examination of the extent to which specific
human capital is positively associated with the
likelihood that newly certified auditors in Spain
will apply for an audit licence to obtain promotion
to a partnership position in an auditing firm re-
quires the calculation of the joint effects of a
newly certified auditor working for a large audit-
ing firm and seniority. As the database does not
contain data about the length of time that newly
certified auditors had worked for the same firm,
the Age variable is used as a proxy for seniority.
Consequently, we measure the joint effects
through the interaction term Age  Big firms, and
support for our contention requires a positive, sig-
nificant coefficient. We also expect a significant
and negative coefficient for Big firms, as per
Model 1. As the logistic regression shown in
Model 1 does not adequately capture the interac-
tion between variables, we estimate Model 2 (see
Table 3). We find that both Big firms and Age 
Big firms are significant (α = 0.01). Furthermore,
we find the expected signs for both coefficients:
negative (–3.522) for Big firms and positive
(0.087) for Age  Big firms. Arguably, the existing
high correlation between this interaction term and
Big firms (0.982) may generate multicollinearity
and a loss of significance for some variables
(Capelli and Cascio, 1991). However, the inclu-
sion of this variable does not involve a loss of sig-
nificance for the Big firms coefficient. The model
remains well fitted to the data, as shown by the
Hosmer–Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test. Our re-
sults indicate a positive relationship between the
process of becoming a licensed auditor and em-
ployment with a large auditing firm when consid-
ering age at the time of joining the ICJCE. Finally,
the remaining coefficients for both the independ-
ent and the control variables are similar to those
shown in the model without the interaction param-
eters (Model 1).
We calculate the adjusted odds ratios to explore
further the relationship between Age and Big firms.
The adjusted odds ratios measure the likelihood 
of a newly certified auditor working for a large 
auditing firm becoming a licensed auditor (see
Figure 3).
As shown in Figure 3, the adjusted odds ratios
depict different patterns for each group of individ-
uals. Newly certified auditors who did not work
for a large auditing firm showed a declining likeli-
hood of becoming business owner-managers be-
tween the ages of 40 and 45 years. After the age of
45 years, however, auditors working for large au-
diting firms were increasingly likely to obtain their
auditing licences. For such individuals, this result
is consistent with the relationship between age and
promotion to partnership positions, which require
the holding of an audit licence.
6. Discussion and conclusions
In this study, we focus on the characteristics of in-
dividuals joining the Spanish auditing profession
during a relevant period of its history, namely,
1976–1988. This observation period had good
prospects for auditors, because of market growth,
and high uncertainty arising from the eventual
consequences of a comprehensive reorganisation
of the profession, ultimately enforced through
state regulation. In this unique social laboratory,
we examine the most significant asset in the audit
market: human capital (Bröcheler et al., 2004). By
focusing on the individual auditor as a unit of
analysis, our study adds to prior research examin-
ing the emergence of the profession in continental
European countries from a macro-perspective (e.g.
professional associations or the profession at large;
see Russia: Sucher and Bychkova, 2001; Slovakia:
Daniel et al., 2001).
Our results indicate that Spanish newly certified
auditors (i) with high general human capital, (ii)
with high specific human capital, (iii) with stable
jobs and (iv) at the beginning or end of their pro-
fessional careers were less likely to apply for an
audit licence than their counterparts with low gen-
eral human capital, low specific human capital, un-
stable jobs, and who were middle-aged. According
to human capital theory (Becker, 1975; Blaug,
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1976), individuals with high human capital outper-
form their counterparts with lower human capital.
Therefore, our results reveal that the decision of
newly certified Spanish auditors to engage in pub-
lic practice constituted a default career choice
(Mincer, 1962; Blaug, 1970, 1976). Some distinc-
tive features of our context may help explain these
findings.
The marketability of professional certifications
such as Certified Public Accountant (CPA) or
Chartered Accountant (CA) may seem inarguable
to an English-speaking audience. Nonetheless, we
advise caution when considering the market value
of the audit certification in other settings; Spain
had no tradition in auditing and mandatory audits
were not actually enforced until very recently.
Good prospects for growth in the Spanish audit
market did not outperform perceptions of high un-
certainty arising from the upcoming reforms,
which would determine the future of the audit
function. Furthermore, the history of professional
associations such as the ICJCE provided support
for contentions about a failure in the ‘professional-
isation process’ of auditing in Spain (Bougen and
Vázquez, 1997). As noted by Carrera (2003) the
audit function was not considered a ‘profession’ in
Spain but a mere ‘activity’. Consequently, doubt-
ful marketability of the audit certificate and failure
in the audit professionalisation process did not at-
tract to public practice newly certified auditors
with high human capital, stable jobs and at the
younger or older end of the age continuum, that is,
those considered as ‘talented’ by human capital
theory (Bröcheler et al., 2004).
During our observation period, a feature of
Spanish society was the imposing role of the gov-
ernment in the economy (Carrera et al., 2001) and
high levels of uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede,
1997). Furthermore, public sector employees en-
joyed a high social status (García Pérez and
Jimeno, 2006) because their jobs involved long-
term stability, regular salary, predictability, and an
internal system of promotion (Hinchliffe, 1987).
Such values, which were highly regarded by
Spanish society, imposed considerable switching
costs on individuals with stable jobs, such as pub-
lic sector employees; 79% of such individuals,
upon completing the examinations leading to the
audit certificate, did not apply for an audit licence.
Arguably, the joint effects of high legal and finan-
cial risks inherent in public practice and high 
uncertainty avoidance in Spanish society discour-
aged those with stable jobs from being entrepre-
neurial and, hence, they remained in their stable
income and long-term jobs (Reynolds et al., 2001:
40). Such decisions could also be a result of civil
servants’ good career prospects; societal claims for
public sector accountability boosted its demand
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Figure 3
Adjusted odds ratios for the variables Age and Big firms
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for auditors (Valverdú Calafell, 1984).
Within a context featuring environmental up-
heaval and good market prospects, our results re-
veal that factors related to uncertainty outweighed
those connected to market opportunities.
Consequently, middle-aged professionals with un-
stable jobs and low general and specific human
capital constituted the most likely candidates to
apply for auditing licences. However, newly certi-
fied auditors with high general and specific human
capital, job security, and at the extremes of the age
continuum declined engagement in audit practice
after earning the audit certificate. In the case of
high profile individuals, the turbulent conditions
experienced by the auditing profession during the
1976–1988 period and the high uncertainty avoid-
ance of Spanish society arguably offset the
prospects for career opportunities coming from
market growth and, ultimately, influenced their de-
cision not to become business owner-managers.
The current study examines the unique social
conditions featured by Spain during 1976–1988,
that is, during the transition from a right-wing mil-
itary dictatorship to a fully-fledged democracy.
Consequently, the approach and findings of this in-
vestigation may be useful to time-space intersec-
tions featuring similar characteristics. In this
respect, further research in this area might capi-
talise on some of the limitations of the present
study. Our paper investigates the auditor’s deci-
sion as to whether or not to become a licensed 
auditor at the time of entry into the profession. It
would be interesting to extend the analysis over
the professional life of certified auditors to gain a
better understanding of the demography of the
audit market. We used educational background and
the contractual relationship with large auditing
firms as proxy variables for human capital.
Although such proxies were consistently em-
ployed in the human capital literature, other prox-
ies, such as a firm’s investment in training, may
provide additional insights into the role of human
capital in auditing firms.
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